Rational argumentation is one of the sources of Quranic interpretation, and interpreters have various perspectives on the source of reason. Ibn Taymiyyah is inclined towards anti-rationalism. The present study, using a descriptive, analytical, and critical method, aims to examine the function of reason and its relation to verbal revelation from the perspective of Ibn Taymiyyah. The results indicated that he is mistaken in theoretical theorization and discussion. In expressing his views on reason, he simultaneously asserts the speculative validity of reason and the lack of credibility of demonstrative reason; despite numerous theoretical arguments, he does not accept anything beyond necessary reason. Furthermore, in this regard, he generally denies rational sciences (philosophy and theology). Although he is sometimes strong in rationalism in foundational discussions, he is agile in anti-rationalism when it comes to comparison and simultaneous reference to reason alongside other evidence, readily launching the harshest attacks on it, as if there is no enmity like reason. Ibn Taymiyyah has been indifferent to the role of reason in the formation of verbal revelation.
Extended Abstract

Introduction

Commentators' reliance on reason in exegesis has continuously shaped their understanding of Quranic verses, fueling ongoing conflict and, over time, leading to the emergence of Islamic schools of thought.
Aḥmad Ibn Taymīyyah stands out in this discourse for his challenging views on the intellect and his unwavering defense of a literal interpretation of the Quran over reason. Disagreements with him focus on whether intellect is valid when faced with literal text. This research seeks to clarify his approach to intellect in Quranic exegesis and its relationship to literal appearance.
To achieve this, this study uses descriptive, analytical, and critical methods to examine Ibn Taymīyyah's views and their supporting evidence.
Research Questions
This study addresses the following research questions:

What is Ibn Taymīyyah’s perspective concerning the employment of reason as a source in Quranic exegesis, and what are the principal criticisms leveled against his approach?
What is his understanding of the relationship between reason and literal interpretation, and what critical assessments have been offered regarding his stance?
Research Background

A review of the relevant literature provides the necessary context for the present study. Numerous scholarly works address the role of reason in Quranic exegesis. Notably, Pathology of Exegetical Movements (As'adi et al., 1397), A Study of Exegetical Schools and Methods (Baba’i, 1398), and al-Tawḥīd ʻind al-Shaykh Ibn Taymīyyah (al-Ḥaydarī, n.d.) analyze the function of reason within exegetical discourse.
In addition to books, several articles further illuminate this field. These include:

A Study of the Ideological Foundations of Salafism in the Semantics of Descriptive Attributes with Emphasis on the Views of Ibn Taymīyyah (Shamsuddini Mutlaq, 1396).

2) An Examination of the Critique of the Conflict between Reason and Transmitted Text in the Viewpoint of Ibn Taymīyyah (Hossein Zadeh and Nusratiyan Ahour, 1398).
3) A Study and Critique of the Ideological Foundations and Principles of Ibn Taymīyyah in Quranic Exegesis (Hossein Zadeh and Nusratiyan Ahour, 1398).
4) Analysis and Comparison of the Relationship between Reason and Transmitted Text from the Viewpoint of Ibn Taymīyyah and Ayatollah Javadi Amoli (Khurasani and Parsaniya, 1396).
5) Ibn Taymīyyah's View on the Conflict between Clear Reason and Authentic Transmitted Text (Ibrahimiyan, 1395).
6)  A Critical Review of Ibn Taymīyyah's Approach to the Exegesis of Ambiguous Verses with Reference to the Views of Allamah Ṭabāṭabā'ī (Alah Badashti and Khanabadi, 1398 a).

Methodology

Building on the literature review, this study will employ a descriptive, analytical, and critical methodology to examine the viewpoints and supporting evidence of Ibn Taymīyyah.

Conclusion

This research reveals that Ibn Taymīyyah's views on intellect in exegesis exhibit internal contradictions:

He sometimes validates conjectural reasoning, surpassing rationalist commentators, while at other times he entirely rejects demonstrative reasoning, failing to distinguish its types in his critique of rational sciences.
Ibn Taymīyyah applies his theory inconsistently: he at times restricts the instrumental intellect's role, yet also uses reason as a source. He attributes rationally contested qualities to God, prioritizing literalism and early practices over demonstrative intellect—even in the absence of a conflict between intellect and text.
Although Ibn Taymīyyah claims to value reason, he based truth on literal meanings and the practices of early generations. To support literal meanings, he ignored some literary rules, called opposing stories false, and saw all God's descriptions as final.
A fundamental criticism of Ibn Taymīyyah is his neglect of reason in forming literal appearances. Divine discourse, deeper than ordinary speech, requires theoretical reason for true comprehension; literary sciences alone are insufficient for Quranic understanding, and he overlooks defining literal appearance.
Literal appearances in ambiguous verses must be established through definitive verses and by viewing intellect as a core source. This principle underlies the rationalist-Ibn Taymīyyah dispute and is why Islamic tradition emphasizes the Ahl al-Bayt and the intellect as authority.
Uṣūlī scholars say that if a literal meaning comes from certain reasoning, it leads to certainty. Two things cannot conflict with certainty, so this conflict should not occur.
Some Uṣūlī scholars think a literal meaning is set only at the end of speech, but others think context can set it. The initial meaning of many verses changed as new verses were revealed over the course of 23 years. So, why can't certain reasoning, which develops with time, also help reveal the true meaning?

8. It is also possible to see several valid literal meanings of the Quran that appear over time, as long as they do not conflict. This is similar to a rule in Islamic law, where a single word can have multiple meanings