Seraje Monir

نقد و بررسی دیدگاه اصولیان در تفسیر روایت «ان دین الله لا یصاب بالعقول»

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Mahdi Shajarian

Assistant Professor, Faculty of Civilization and social studies, Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy, Qom, Iran

https://doi.org/10.22054/ajsm.2025.81518.2069
Abstract
How is the perspective of the Usulis evaluated regarding the narration “Indeed, the religion of God is not grasped by intellects”? This research employs an analytical-critical method to analyze and critique the views of the Usulis concerning this narration. From the Usuli perspective, the reason that intellect does not grasp divine law is the intellect’s lack of comprehensive understanding of the criteria for legal rulings, and the judgment of the intellect lacks authority unless it aligns with evidence. Consequently, to ensure alignment, one must rely on definitive intellect and the ruling intellect concerning general categories such as justice and injustice, while the judgment of the intellect in specifics and applications is not authoritative. Conversely, it seems that there is no necessary connection between the negation of grasp and the negation of authority, and intellect can serve as a proof, like other Usuli evidences, even in cases of potential misalignment. On the other hand, the subject of this narration is not the conjectural intellect governing specifics, but rather the non-rebuttable intellect in rational practice, which specifically confronts the tradition—rather than opposing the narration that reveals it—by relying on analogy during the era of the infallible. The implication of the Usuli viewpoint is to apply the numerous texts regarding the authority of intellect to a rare individual, namely the definitive intellect governing generalities. Additionally, the issuance of the aforementioned narration, due to its inclusion of unknown narrators and its opposition to the spirit of the Holy Quran, is a matter worthy of consideration.
Extended Abstract

Introduction

This study critically evaluates the interpretation of Uṣūlī scholars of the narration attributed to Imam Sajjād (AS): "Indeed, the religion of God is not attained by intellects." The main argument centers on whether Uṣūlī interpretations rightly limit the role of reason in deriving jurisprudential rulings. The significance lies in resolving the apparent contradiction between this narration and numerous Qur'anic and narrative texts that affirm the authority of reason, and assessing its impact on the status of reason as a primary source in Shi'i jurisprudence. This research is necessary to precisely define the boundaries of reason's authority in juristic inference and to clarify its true epistemological status.

Literature Review

Based on the author's investigation, no specific prior research was found that exclusively examines the Uṣūlī interpretation of this narration. The general background of this research consists of primary Uṣūlī sources that have explained and interpreted this narration, which are utilized within the main text. The oldest Uṣūlī source cited for this narration is the book al-Durar al-Najafīyyah by Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī, dating back to the 12th century Hijri. Furthermore, some articles have tangentially referred to this narration in the context of other discussions; for instance, some have considered it specific to the prohibition of analogical reasoning, others have deemed it one of the evidences denying the reliance on reason, some have interpreted it as referring to the inability of reason to discover the underlying rationales of rulings, and others have emphasized the qualifying phrase "Deficient intellects" in the narration. However, none have undertaken a detailed and independent critique and examination of the Uṣūlī understanding of this hadith. The novelty of this article lies in consolidating and structuring the disparate views of the Uṣūlīs and critiquing this perspective with five independent criticisms.

Methodology

This fundamentally theoretical research employs a descriptive-analytical and critical approach, grounded in Hadith science and the Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. By examining primary Uṣūlī and Hadith sources, the author extracts and analyzes the main arguments of Uṣūlī scholars regarding the narration of the Prophet Muhammad. An explicit focus is placed on the Uṣūlī rationale for restricting reason’s authority and the practical consequences for Islamic legal inference. The critique then targets the logical consistency and jurisprudential implications of this position, culminating in an alternative interpretation aligned with the research question.
Uṣūlī scholars maintain that reason cannot fully grasp the underlying benefits and harms of divine rulings, concluding that rational judgment is not inherently authoritative. To address this, they set conditions under which reason may be considered authoritative—namely, certainty and generality—leading to a highly restricted scope of rational authority. This section sharpens the central argument: Uṣūlīs' strict limitations on reason are based on perceived epistemological barriers, not on a total denial of rational relevance.

B) Critique of the Uṣūlī Perspective: This perspective faces five fundamental criticisms: 1) No Necessary Correlation Between Denying Attainment and Denying Authority: The narration only indicates a "Lack of Attainment" (failure to fully grasp), and there is no necessary correlation between this and a denial of authority; just as other Uṣūlis evidences like solitary reports (Khabar Wāḥid, a type of individual report in hadith studies) can be erroneous yet are still considered authoritative.

2) Resolving the Apparent Conflict with the Texts Supporting the Authority of Reason: In light of the previous point, by clarifying the aforementioned lack of necessary correlation, the contradiction between this narration and the numerous texts supporting the authority of reason (in the Qur'an and hadiths) is negated.
3) Incorrect Identification of the Subject of the Narration: The subject of the narration is not "Speculative Reason" (al-ʻAql al-Ẓannī, referring to uncertain reasoning), but rather "reason that is not admissible as proof according to rational custom", the most prominent example of which was the analogical reasoning (Qīyās, the use of analogies to derive laws) employed by the Ahl al-Sunnah. The explicit mention of "Corrupt Criteria/Corrupt Analogies" (al-Maqāyīs al-Fāsidah, meaning flawed analogical reasoning) in the narration itself supports this claim.
4) Interpreting Numerous Texts as Pertaining to Rare Instances: The necessary implication of the Uṣūlī view is that the numerous and emphatic texts on the authority of reason are interpreted as referring to rare and limited cases (such as a few general rulings), which is incompatible with the general nature of this evidence.
5) Scrutiny of the Chain of Transmission and Content of the Narration: The chain of transmission (Sanad, the list of narrators) of the narration is weak due to the presence of two unknown narrators. Furthermore, content that denies the authority of reason conflicts with the overarching spirit of the Noble Qur'an.

Conclusion

The predominant view of the Uṣūlī scholars in interpreting the narration "Indeed, the religion of God is not attained by intellects," which leads to a severe restriction of the scope of reason's authority to certain and general rulings, faces serious challenges. It seems that the correct interpretation of this narration is not the absolute denial of the authority of reason, but rather the denial of "Impeccabilism" (i.e., the claim of infallibility for reason) and also a critique of inferential methods based on "Analogical Reasoning" and the like (as an exemplar of reason that is inadmissible as proof in rational custom). Therefore, this narration does not pose an obstacle to utilizing reason as one of the valid sources of inference, alongside other evidence. This research constitutes a step towards revising the understanding of an influential narration and elucidating the true position of reason within the epistemological framework of religious inference.

Keywords

Authority of Reason
Attainment by Reason
Analogical Reasoning
Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence
Subjects
 
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Seraje Monir
Volume 16, Issue 51
September 2025
Pages 175-204

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